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CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION, PURE
PROFITS AND THE LUXURY TAX
ABSTRACT
We examine a model of conspicuous consumption and explore the nature of competition in
markets for conspicuous goods. We assume that, in addition to intrinsic utility, individuals seek
status, and that perceptions of wealth affect status. Under identifiable conditions, the model
generates Veblen effects: utility is positively related to the price of the good consumed. Equilibria
are then characterized by the existence of "budget' brands (which are sold at a price equal to
marginal cost), as well as 'luxury" brands (which are sold at a price above marginal cost, despite
the fact that producers are perfectly competitive). Luxury brands are not intrinsically superior to
budget brands but are purchased by consumers who seek to signal high levels of wealth. Within
the context of this model, an appropriately designed luxury tax is a non-distortionary tax on pure
profits.
Laurie Simon Bagwell B. Douglas Bernheim
Northwestern University Department of Economics
Evanston, IL 60208 Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
and NBER1. Introduction
In his celebrated treatise on the "leisure class," Thorstein Veblen [1899] argued that
wealthy individuals often consume highly conspicuous goods and services in order to advertise
their wealth, thereby achieving greater social status.Veblen's writings have spawned a
significant body of research on "prestige" or "status" goods.' It is readily apparent that the
desire for prestige continues to influence the demand for certain consumer products. The
automobile industry provides several examples. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal noted
that "a BMW in every driveway might thrill investors in the short run but ultimately could
dissipate the prestige that lures buyers to these luxury cars" (Aeppel [1992]). In contrast,
Suburu attempts to combat the prestige factor; its recent advertisements suggest that "if your car
improves your standing with your neighbors then you live among snobs."
Recent incarnations of Veblen's theories often proceed from the premise that the utility
derived from a good is positively related to its price (see e.g. Leibenstein [1950], Braun and
Wicklund [1989], or Creedy and Slottje [1991]). Indeed, a positive relationship between utility
and price is often equated with the notion of conspicuous consumption, and is commonly
referred to as a "Veblen effect. "2Thisstrikes us as an inappropriate starting point for a theory
'See for example Leibenstein [1950], and more recently Frank [1985], Basu [1987], Ng
[1987], Basmann, Molina, and Slottje [1988], Braun and Wicklund [1989], Creedy and Slottje
[1991], and Ireland [1992]. More generally, other recent studies, including Akerlof [1980],
Jones [1984], Besley and Coate [1990], Bernheim [1991b], Cole, Mailath, and Posteiwaite
[1991], and Fershtman and Weiss [1992], explore the impact of status-consciousness on
economic behavior.
2The following passage typifies modern discussions of prestige goods: "Conspicuous
consumption, or Veblen effects, are said to occur when individuals increase their demand for
a good simply because it has a higher price" (Creedy and Slottje [1991]).of conspicuous consumption. It is hard to imagine circumstances in which the price of an object
wouldaffectutility directly. Veblen proposed that individuals crave status, not that they seek
to pay high prices for the sheer pleasure of being overcharged. Thus, utility should be defined
over consumption and status, rather than over consumption and prices. Although the prices that
one pays for goods may affect status in equilibrium, this relationship should be derived, not
assumed.
Once the need to derive an equilibrium relation between price and utility is
acknowledged, one must determine whether or not any plausible model of conspicuous
consumption would generate Veblen effects. It is not at all obvious that, in such an equilibrium,
higher price would enhance utility. Suppose for example that individuals care about status and
that status is positively related to the public perception of an individual's wealth. Then, as
Veblen suggested, individuals might attempt to enhance their status by displaying their wealth.
However, there is no particular reason to believe that this is most effectively accomplished by
paying higher prices. Instead, one might prefer to purchase a larger quantity of conspicuous
goods at a lower price, or a higher quality conspicuous good at a higher price.3
This paper examines a model in which each individual's status depends upon public
perceptions of his wealth. Consumers have private information about the value of their assets,
and attempt to signal their wealth by consuming a conspicuous good. The producers of this
3Certain social customs in Thailand illustrate the practice of advertising wealth through
quantity, rather than price. According to Shenon [1991], "It is considered acceptable, even by
some Western-educated Thai women who would otherwise describe themselves as feminists, for
a man to take one or more mistresses and even to be seen with them in public, so long as all of
the women and their children are provided for financially... Mistresses are to some degree a
demonstration of wealth, and as a rule, the more mistresses, the wealthier the man. A handful
of Bangkok's flashier millionaires are said to have 10 or more extramarital companions."
2good compete under conditions that wouldordinarily producea perfectly competitive outcome
(priceequal to marginal cost). The good is completely homogeneousacrossfirms, except that
producers visibly label their products (labelling doesaffect utility directly).
We show that, under identifiable conditions, the equilibria of this model are characterized
by the existence of "budget brands (sold at a price equal to marginal cost), as well as luxury"
brands (sold at a price above marginal cost). Luxury brands are purchased by consumers who
seek to signal high levels of wealth. It is important to bear in mind that the luxury brands are
not intrinsically superior to the budget brands --theyare simply sold at a higher price. The
manufacturers of these brands earn strictly vositive economic profits, despite the highly
competitive nature of the market. Thus, the model explains the observation that brand-name
producers apparently charge high premia on many status goods, even when these goods are
easily imitated.4 Moreover, our model implies that firms will not ordinarily dissipate excess
profits through rent seeking activities, such as advertising. Thus, evidence of high profitability
among the manufacturers of luxury goods does not necessarily support the inference that
competition is less than perfect.
The model does not constrain consumers to signal wealth by purchasing the expensive
luxury brands; it is also possible to signal by consuming large quantities of less expensive
brands. Thus, a positive reduced form relation between utility and price (a Veblen effect) is
generated from more primitive assumptions on the structure of consumer preferences.
It should be emphasized that the existence of Veblen effects depends critically upon the
4lreland [1992] describes an interesting case of this involving a very expensive brand-named
basketball shoe: "The shoes became so much a passport to social success among poor urban
teenagers that a campaign to limit their commercial promotion and advertising was initiated."
3fact that the model incorporates a personal bankruptcy constraint. In particular, by purchasing
expensive, conspicuous goods, an individual may increase the risk of bankruptcy. This
assumption captures two empirical regularities: first, many wealthy individuals are at significant
risk of bankruptcy (see for example Allen [1991]); second, this risk is often associated with the
acquisition of costly, conspicuous possessions.5 In the absence of a bankruptcy constraint, the
model wouldproduce Veblen effects; consumers would signal wealth by consuming large
amounts of budget brands, rather than by purchasing smaller amounts of luxury brands.
Why does the risk of personal bankruptcy give rise to conditions under which individuals
may choose to signal their wealth by overpaying for luxury brands? Consumption of
conspicuous goods reduces expenditures on other goods. With declining marginal rates of
substitution, this would ordinarily imply that conspicuous consumption is more costly for low
income households. Personal bankruptcy protection, however, establishes a lower bound on
consumption. As the probability of bankruptcy rises, a unit increase in conspicuous consumption
leads to a smaller decline in the expected consumption of other goods. At high levels of
conspicuous consumption, the marginal cost of conspicuous spending is actually lower for low
income households. As a result, it is less expensive for high income households to deter
imitation by overpaying for a smaller quantity of goods, rather than by paying a lower price (and
spending more in total) for a larger quantity of goods. In the abstract, this argument resembles
Milgrom and Roberts' [1986] analysis of advertising as a signal of product quality.
5One reporter recently summarized this relationship as foUows: "In the 1980s, people lived
out their materialistic dreams, overspending on BMWs, huge boats, Caribbean vacations and
dream condos, bankruptcy lawyers say. Then came the real estate crash and the job layoffs.
Now, lawyers say, their clients are using their credit cards for basic necessities, including food
and children's clothes" (Carton [1991]).
4Our model of conspicuous consumption also has some provocative implications for tax
policy. The fact that pure profits survive vigorous competition among suppliers suggests that
the equilibrium prices of luxury brandsaredemand-driven, rather than supply-driven --thatis,
luxury brands are sold at the consumers preferred price. Within our model, this preferred price
is tax-inclusive, and does not vary with the tax rate. Thus, as long as the tax per unit does not
exceed the difference between the consumer's preferred price and marginal cost, an excise tax
on luxury brands amounts to a non-distortionary tax on pure profits.
This observation is of particular interest in light of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, which established substantial federal taxes on the sale of various conspicuous
goods, including expensive automobiles, yachts, jewehy, and aircraft. One should not conclude
from our analysis that these taxes are non-distortionary; whether the demand for luxury items
is best described by our model or some alternative is a question that can be settled only through
empirical analysis. However, a central prediction of our model --thatthe tax-inclusive price
will be unaffected by the luxury tax --issupported by some anecdotal evidence. Specifically,
Rolls Royce, Jaguar, and BMW have each run promotional campaigns in which they have
offered to reimburse customers for the full amount of the luxury tax.°
recent advertisement for Rolls Royce reads: "If the luxury tax is all that separates us, it's
time to talk. From today through December 31, 1991, Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Inc. will
reimburse you for the full amount of the federal luxury excise tax incurred when you purchase
or lease a new Rolls-Royce or Bentley." Similar, Jaguar advertised: "Now you can have Jaguar
luxury, frofthe luxury tax... Just buy or lease a new 1990 or 1991 Sovereign, Vanden Plas
or XI-S from your Jaguar dealer and we'll send you a reimbursement check equal to the luxury
tax based on the manufacturer's suggested retail price." It is particularly interesting to note that
Jaguar did iofferthis deal on the XJ-6, which is its least expensive automobile. Finally, an
advertisement for BMW reads: "We will pay the luxury tax on any new BMW purchased and
delivered by December 31, 1991."
5The paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in section 2. Section 3
contains the central results on equilibrium prices and profits. Section 4 considers the possibility
that firms might dissipate positive profits (specifically, through advertising), and concludes that
this will not occur. Implications for tax policy are described in section 5.Weexamine some
critical assumptions in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Households
Consider a household that must allocate resources over two consumption goods. One
good is "conspicuous, in the sense that its characteristics, as well as the quantity consumed, are
publicly observed. The second good is inconspicuous, in the sense that it is consumed
privately, and not observed by others. Because of our assumptions about observability, only
conspicuous consumption can potentially serve as a signal of wealth. We will use the
inconspicuous good as the numeraire.
The household is endowed with resources, A. It first allocates a portion of these
resources to purchase the conspicuous good; let s and x denote, respectively, total conspicuous
expenditures and the quantity purchased.Next, the household receives income, which is
uncertain. Since conspicuous consumption has already been chosen, consumption of the
inconspicuous good, z, is determined as a residual. These assumptions about the sequence of
decision-making, though highly stylized, are appropriate for modeling situations in which
conspicuous goods are durable and not easily sold in second-hand markets. See section 6 for
further discussion.
Households differ according their expected level of income, Y. There are two types of
households. Some expect their income to be higher (YF.), while others expect it to be lower (YL,
where YL <Y.).The associated population frequencies are y and (l—y), respectively. Each
6household knows itsown type, but cannot observe thetype of anyother household. A higher
incomehousehold ultimatelyreceivesH +whereis a mean-zero randomvariable; a lower
income householdreceives Y+. Let F()denotethe cumulative distribution function
associatedwith, and let f() be the associateddensity function.'We do not rule out the case
where Y+<0for K =L,H; thatis,liabilities may arise. Income is measured in units
ofthe inconspicuous good.
Inaddition to conspicuous consumption, x, and inconspicuous consumption, z, each
household also cares about status. Statusdependsupon public perceptions of the household's
total expected wealth, R = A + Y.& Since R isnotpublicly observable, other households will
form inferences about a particular household's wealth based upon its actions. Knowing this,
eachhouseholdmay alterits actionsin order to create the impression that ithas greaterwealth.
This gives rise to a signalingproblem. Wewill simplify this problembyassuming that all
uninformedparties form identicalinferences abouta household's totalwealth, andbyfocusing
onseparating equilibria. Public perceptions of a household's total wealth can then be described
bya single number, R. Household preferences over x,z, and are summarized by the
following utility function:
U(x,z,R)=u(x) + v(z) +
where X > 0 is a parameter. We refer to u(x) and v(z) as "intrinsic utility." We assume that
7Thedistributionof is identical across types.
3Note that status depends upon perceptions of expectedwealth,R, rather than realized
wealth,R+E.In other words, esteem is based upon perceptions of a household's capacity for
generatingincome,and not upon chanceevents,unrelatedto innate characteristics, that might
haveaffectedaparticular realization of income.Theanalysis would be unchanged ifstatus
depends uponperceptions of realizedwealth, aslong aspersonalbankruptcy (discussed later)
isunobservable. If statusis related to perceivedrealizations and ifpersonalbankruptcy is
observable, then analyticalcomplexitiesarise;however,itdoes notappear that this would
qualitativelyalter ourconclusions.
7u and v are concave functions, that
Urn u(x)= — , limu(x) =, urnv(z) =— , limv(z) =
x-0 x- z—.O
and that, for any i >0,u"(t) and v"(t) are bounded for t ￿i.
We assume that consumption of the inconspicuous good is bounded below by some >
0.If exceeds (R -s+ ), the residual resources available to the household at the point in time
when it arranges its inconspicuous consumption, the household declares bankruptcy. This allows
it to renege on some portion of its liabilities, and to keep the amount z.Thus,the actual level
of inconspicuous consumption is given by
z =max{z,R
—s+
Weassume that the household's conspicuous consumption, x, is unaffected by a
declaration of bankruptcy. In other words, the conspicuous good cannot be repossessed. This
assumption requires some justification. In practice, significant time may pass between the
acquisition of a conspicuous good and a declaration of bankruptcy, during which the conspicuous
good may be partially or completely consumed. Moreover, bankruptcy courts often allow
individuals to retain expensive automobiles, yachts, large houses, and other conspicuous
possessions)° One could, at the cost of introducing considerable analytic complexity, assume
that, in the event of bankruptcy, a household consumes some fraction(0 <i < 1) ofits
conspicuous possessions, while the remainder, (l-)x, is repossessed. It does not appear that
this would disturb the qualitative features of our analysis.
Once a household has spent s to purchase x units of the conspicuous good, its expected
9Alternatively, the government might supplement the income of this household, providing
it with inconspicuous consumption of zthroughsome social insurance or welfare program.
'°See for example Downey [1991) or Hylton [1991].
Sintrinsic utility is given by




4'(t) measures the expected intrinsic utility derived from consumption of the inconspicuous good
when the individual's expected residual resources after expenditures on the conspicuous good
are t. Its properties are critical to the analysis.
Note that 'P(t) is bounded below by v(z). In the absence of additional assumptions, this
can give rise to perverse outcomes. Suppose for the moment that the conspicuous good is
available at some price p, so that s =px.Then clearly E(R,x,s) is maximized for x =
Thissuggests that households should optimize by consuming an infinite amount of the
conspicuous good and then declaring bankruptcy (which would leave them with zunitsof the
inconspicuous good). One could rule this strategy out by modeling credit markets explicitly.
Instead, we simply impose the constraint s ￿ A + B for some finite number B, thereby
implicitly ruling out borrowing beyond the level B. We will also take A + B to be sufficiently
large so that liquidity is not an issue.
Increasing the expected residual resources t available after conspicuous consumption
clearly increases expected intrinsic utility from the inconspicuous good, since
= 0.
The curvature of '4'(t), however, depends on the relative importance of two countervailing
effects. The first is associated with decreasing marginal utility, and the second results from
bankruptcy protection. These separate effects are evident in the following expression:
9= JvhI(t+ )f() d+ v'&)f(
—t).
The first term of '(t) captures the effect of decreasing marginal utility. As expenditure
on the inconspicuous good increases, the marginal utility of inconspicuous consumption declines,
since v') < 0. In the absence of bankruptcy protection (i.e. z =— ), thiswould make
4'(t) concave. Because of this effect, the sacrifice of inconspicuous consumption is more costly
to lower income households. Higher income households can therefore deter imitation by
consuming the conspicuous good.
The second term of '(t) captures the effect of bankruptcy protection. As residual
resources fall, an individual is more likely to declare bankruptcy and consume .Thus,his
expected consumption becomes less sensitive to his resources.This makes conspicuous
consumption less costly for lower income individuals. By itself (for example if v') =0,so
that this component of utility is linear), this effect would render ''(t) convex. Because of this
effect, lower income households may be more inclined to mimic conspicuous consumption.
We make two assumptions that influence the relative importance of these two effects, and
guarantee that T(t) is initially convex, and ultimately concave.
ASSUMPTION 1. 'l"(R1) <
ASSUMPTION 2. limf()=
1 -F()
Assumption 1 ensures that the first unit of conspicuous consumption is more costly for
lower income households. It requires the effect of diminishing marginal utility to dominate the
personal bankruptcy effect ('(t) < 0) when residual resources are high (for t belonging to
some sufficiently large subset of [RL, RJ). Note that Assumption 1 doesimply the standard
"single crossing property" commonly used in signaling models, since it only applies when s=0.
The following conditions are, in combination, sufficient to guarantee that Assumption 1
is satisfied: (i) v() is either a CARA or CRRA utility function, (ii) f(S) is a normal density
10function, and (lii) RL is large." In the context of this analysis, condition (iii) is entirely
appropriate: we are envisioning a pool of cx ante identical individuals whose observable
characteristics do not rule out the possibility that they have substantial total wealth. Assumption
1 sets the stage for signaling: unless the marginal costs of conspicuous consumption are higher
for the lower income individuals over some range, no signaling is possible.
Assumption 2 guarantees that, at sufficiently high levels of conspicuous consumption,
incremental consumption is more costiy for hiJii income households. Equivalently, it ensures
that the effect of bankruptcy protection dominates the effect of diminishing marginal utility when
is sufficiently small (possibly negative), so that '"(t) >0.This assumption is satisfied by
the normal distribution, as well as other common distribution functions. It is essential for
producing our conclusion that higher income individuals will prefer to signal by overpaying for
a small quantity of luxury goods.
Hence, 'P(t) is initially convex, and ultimately concave. In Figure 1, we graph''(R —s)
and 'P(RH -s)as functions of s for a typical ''().Notethat ''(RL— s)starts out steeper (by
assumption 1), but eventually becomes flatter (by assumption 2). This constitutes a violation of
the "single crossing property"; due to the reversal of marginal costs, indifference curves defined
over x and--usingthe budget constraint to determine s --crosstwice, rather than once.
From Figure 1 it is clear that, under our assumptions, there exists a finite, positive level
of conspicuous expenditure, s, that maximizes the difference between the expected utilities
derived from the inconspicuous good by the two types of households. This property is critical
to our analysis of competitive behavior. We therefore state it as a lemma, and provide a formal
proof.
"Together, conditions (i) and (ii) imply that, for all d, v"(t+d)/f(t) approaches -ast goes
to .Tounderstand the importance of this observation, consult the expression for '(t).
Assumption 1 is in fact much less demanding; it merely requires that the limit of v"(t+d)ff(t)
isless than v).
11LEMMA 1.There exists some finite s > 0 that solves
max -
PROOF.Recall that
=Jv(t + e) f(s)de +v'()f( —t).
By our assumption on v(), v11(t+e) is bounded for e E (z- t,).Let D denote its
lower bound. Then
*"(t) ￿ [1 —F(—t)JD v)f(—t).
But, by assumption 2, this is positive for -t sufficiently large. We conclude that there exists an
such that if s > , — s)> 0.




The final inequality follows from the fact that for all s E [,s'], ''"(t)is positive on
[RL -s,RH -s],given the definition of .Thus,increasing s beyondreduces the value of
the objective function.
Since [0, fliscompact and since '(t) is continuous, the objective function reaches a
maximum somewhere on [O,]. By assumption 1, the maximum cannot occur at s =0.The
lemma therefore is proven. Q.E.D.
It is worth emphasizing that this result depends upon the failure of the single-crossing
property. If the diminishing marginal utility effect always dominated, guaranteeing that the
12marginal cost of the potential signal was always higher for low income households (as in more
standard models), then maximization of Y(R -s)-Y(R-s)would be accomplished through
infinite conspicuous expenditure (s' would not be finite).
For analytic convenience, in what follows we will assume that s is unique. One can
easily dispense with this simplification at the cost of some additional notation and analysis.
2.2
The conspicuous good can be produced by a large number of firms.'2 These firms are
divided into two groups. The first group consists of incumbents. There are F incumbents,
indexed f C (1F]. The rest of the firms are potential entrants. All firms produce the same
homogenous conspicuous good, at the same constant marginal cost c. The production technology
exhibits constant returns to scale (average cost equals marginal cost).
Each firm's product is "branded or "labeled, so that anyone can easily identify which
firm produced it. Branding does not affect utility directly, and in any ordinary (inconspicuous)
context, branding would be irrelevant. We assume that all firms brand their products.
Alternatively, one could allow the firms to choose between labeling and not labeling. In
equilibrium, some would label, and the outcome would be the same as described here.
All consumers observe the prices announced by all firms. Since consumers also observe
brand labels, they can infer any household's expenditure on conspicuous products. We endow
incumbents with the following minor advantage over entrants: consumers will buy the product
from an incumbent, unless they canjçfly improve their utility by buying from an entrant. In
the context of conspicuous goods, this assumption is natural and appealing. It should be noted
that this structure necessarily yields zero profits under standard assumptions about demand.
'2We have assumed that both households' initial resources and income consist of the
inconspicuous good. Consequently, we abstract from the processes by which that good is
produced and allocated.
132.3 Timinz
The game unfolds as follows. First, each incumbent f announces a price, p, for the
conspicuous good. Second, potential competitors observe these prices, and then decide whether
to enter. If a firm chooses to enter, it announces a price for the conspicuous good.'3 Third,
consumers observe all announced prices, and determine the amount of conspicuous good to be
purchased from each firm. Each consumer carries out these transactions, spending in total the
amount s and acquiring in total the amount x. Fourth, consumers observe each others' branded
conspicuous consumption bundles, and form inferences about each others' wealth. Fifth, income
is realized, and residual resources are used for inconspicuous consumption. The payoff to each
consumer is given by U(x,z,), where x is the amount of the conspicuous good consumed in the
third stage,is the inference that others draw about the consumer's utility in stage 4, and z
is the amount of the inconspicuous good consumed in stage 5.Firm'spayoffs are given by
profits (revenues minus costs).
2.3 Equilibrium
Our game is divided into two main phases. In the first phase (stages 1 and 2), firms
compete by naming prices.In the second phase (stages 3 through 5),individualsselect
consumption bundles and draw inferences about each others' characteristics. The second phase
is a signaling game. We reduce the set of equilibria through the use of a refinement that is
similar in spirit to subgame perfection: for any outcome of the first phase, actions and inferences
constitute a separating equilibrium in the second phase, and this equilibrium satisfies the intuitive
criterion (see Cho and Kreps [19871 for a discussion of the intuitive criterion, which is
'3Since one can take F, the number of incumbents, to be large, allowing for further entry
in the second stage may seem superfluous. One might therefore be inclined to delete this stage.
We do not believe that this would alter our results. However, it would render the analysis more
complex, as the current structure allows us to ignore problematic subgames (e.g. if all firms
name a very low or very high price). The reader should bear in mind that potential entry in the
second stage only serves to strengthen competitive pressures.
14equivalent to equilibrium dominance).'4 Given this behavior, we look for Bertrand-style
equilibria in the first phase.
It is useful to describe the second phase equilibria in a bit more detail. Let P denote the
set of prices announced by firms in the first and second stages. Define p =minP,and
=znaxP.Note that, unless p =, andindividual's conspicuous consumption, x, does not
uniquely determine his total conspicuous expenditure, s. Depending upon which brands he
selects, he may spend as little as px, or as much as x. In fact, for any s satisfying
pa <s<x,it is possible to purchase x units of the conspicuous good for exactly s.'5
Norational consumer would ever spend more than the minimal amount needed to acquire
a given quantity of the inconspicuous good. However, a consumer may be willing to spend
more than pa to acquire x units of the conspicuous good. Since others can observe his level of
consumption, x, his selection of brands, and brand prices, they can infer his total expenditure,
s. By spending extravagantly on expensive brands, an individual with higher wealth may be able
to convince others of his opulence, thereby enhancing his status."
'4Equilibrium with complete pooling can be ruled out with the intuitive criterion. There do
exist equilibria with imperfect separation which survive the intuitive criterion and stronger
refinements. These equilibria also give rise to the kinds of results developed here, so for
simplicity we focus exclusively on separation.
'5Specificafly, the individual could purchase x units atand (l-,j)x units at p, where
(!p)/-p). x
"Implicit in our notion of equilibrium is the assumption that others will actually choose to
compute an individual's conspicuous expenditures from his observed purchases, and that they
will use this information to draw inferences about his wealth. Technically speaking, since an
individual's inferences about others do not affect his own utility, no one has any incentive to
draw correct inferences. We have, in effect, endowed each individual with a strict preference
for drawing accurate inferences about each others' characteristics. There are many ways to
justify this assumption. For example, in some later period individuals may receive more utility
from interacting with others of higher status; consequently they may be willing to expend effort
in order to determine the status of potential acquaintances.
15Formally, a separating equilibrium consists of total conspicuous quantity and expenditure
choices (S,x,5,Xg)satisfyingincentive compatibility,





Moreover,these choices must be optimal given the relationship between inferences and actions
that are not taken in equilibrium.
Our description of a separating equilibrium is incomplete in the following sense: although
we have specified total conspicuous consumption (XLandx) as well as total conspicuous
expenditure (5Lands, we have not indicated which brands are purchased. There may well be
an infinite number of conspicuous consumption bundles containing XKunits,and requiring an
expenditure of exactly sx (K =L,H).'7 Fortunatelythis is immaterial, since consumers do not
care about brand selection, except insofar as it affects total cost. Indeed, consumers are
completely indifferent between all conspicuous consumption bundles containing the same total
number of units, and requiring the same total expenditures. We resolve this indifference in
favor of incumbent brands: consumers will not purchase the conspicuous good from entrants
unless this fljçjj,y improves their utility. In the context of conspicuous goods, this assumption
is natural and appealing (there are recognized brand names). The resulting advantage for
'Suppose, for example, that there are three brands, A, B, and C, sold at three prices, PA
< PB < P and suppose that PA < 5K/XK < p. Then there is an infinite number of bundles,
(XA,xB,xc), satisfying pAxA+pBxB+pcxc =5K, XA+XB+XC = XK, andx ￿ 0 (j=A,B,C).
16incumbents is minor, and wouldnot sufficeto protect positive profits if the good in questionwas
inconspicuous. Although this assumption does nottiedown consumer choice completely (e.g.
there may still be indifference across conspicuous consumption bundles containing only
incumbent brands), our results are not sensitive to the manner in which residual indifference is
resolved.
One final condition is needed to guarantee that an interesting signaling problem arises.
Let x denote the amount of conspicuous good that an individual of type K would purchase if





(RL,xH,cxH) +XRH> E(RL,x,cx) +
Thiscondition states that, with marginal cost pricing, individuals with lower wealth would be
willing to mimic the firstbest conspicuous consumption choices of wealthier individuals if, by
doing so, they could achieve the status of those with higher wealth.
3.Resutts
In this section, we characterize the separating equilibria of this model. We begin by
arguing that, in the third stage, the type Ls will always choose conspicuous quantity (x ￿ 0) and






17The argument here is standard. In equilibrium, the Ls are correctly identified. Therefore, they
cannot reduceby deviating from their prescribed choice. Consequently, if there is another.
x ￿0and feasible p that raises the value of E(),itmust make them better off. This
contradicts the supposition that an equilibrium prevails.
The free entry assumption, combined with the usual Bertrand-style argument,
immediately implies that some firm (either incumbent or entrant) must, in equilibrium, sell its
product at price c. Moreover, all type Ls will buy from such firms. Thus, in equilibrium, we
have (xL,s) =(x,s1),where s =cx.







E(RL,x,s) + XRH￿ (RL,x,cx)+ XRL.
Thatis, the type Hs maximize their expected intrinsic utility, buying from a combination of
different firms offering prices betweenand,subjectto the constraint that the types Ls must
choose not to mimic them.
To see that this is indeed an implication of the intuitive criterion, suppose that the type





Recall that for any quantity x consumers can achieve any expenditure level between xandx
simply by purchasing x from more than one firm. Moreover, one can always make the second
inequality strict by finding the solution to the optimization problem, and taking x slightly below
the optimal value. Thus, by the intuitive criterion, agents must infer H when they observe
(x,s). But then type Hs have an incentive to deviate. Consequently, the equilibrium does
not pass the intuitive criterion. '
Forthe moment, ignore the first constraint, and consider the case where =0and
=. Inthat case, it is easy to see that the second constraint (incentive compatibility) ini
bind:increasing XHraisesthe value of the objective function, and can never make the first
constraint bind, so the household increases x until the second constraint binds. We can
therefore substitute the constraint (algebraically manipulated using the definition of ())intothe
objective function to obtain
max ['l'(RH-s) —4'Ok—s)]+[(L,x,cx)+X(RL-RH)].
x's
The second bracketed term is invariant with respect to x and s. The first term is maximized at
=s',which was defined in lemma 1 (section 2.1). The associated value of x is determined
by the binding incentive compatibility constraint:
=U(E(RL,xL,cxlj +X(RLRH) —
Givenour assumptions on u(), f always exists. Define
Note that this argument doesapply when (xH,s) solves the programming problem.
19p.=.
Underour assumptions, x > 0 and s > 0, so p > 0.
Now reintroduce the first constraint. As long as ￿ p ￿ ,(x,s)is still a solution
to the optimization problem. Consequently, the type H agents will choose x =xand SH =
Ourcentral result concerns cases in which p > c. Note that since p does not depend
on c (and exceeds zero), one can satisfy this inequality simply by choosing c small.
Alternatively, since"
lim P =
onecould also obtain p > c by taking X large.2° When p > c, we automatically have p <
p (this follows from a previous argument, since some firm will set price equal to c for the type
Ls). Next we argue that, in equilibrium, we also have ￿ p.
Suppose that < p. Then an entrant could name exactly p. The intuitive criterion
implies that all type Hs would purchase exactly x from that firm at p. The entrant would earn
positive profits, so we could not have been in equilibrium. By the same reasoning, one can
show that at least one incumbent must select p ￿ p. It follows that type H agents only
purchase the conspicuous good from incumbents.
We conclude that, in equilibrium, type H agents necessarily buy Xff= ffrom incumbent
"This follows from two facts: lim u(x) =-(which implies that f goes to 0 as X goes
to infinity), and s is independent of X.
2'The fact that x goes to 0 as X goes to infinity gives rise to the curious result that, for large
X, high income households actually consume less of the conspicuous good, even though they
spend more on it. Luxury automobiles may provide an example: it is arguable that more
expensive cars do not necessarily provide more valuable services.
20firms, at a cost of sxs'. Their total profits (per capita) are (s-xc), recalling that y is
defined to be the frequency of higher income households. Since s •—xc =(p-c)x > 0,
profits are strictly positive.
It is useful to summarize our results for the case where p > c in the form of a
proposition. Define the effective (or average) prices p =- andL =
pRoposmoN.Ifp>c, then in eouilibrium
PH =P
1k =C.
In these cases: (i type H consumers ourchase the conspicuous good only from the incumbents
who, in total, earn strictly positive orofits. and (ii) effective prices. (p,p), and agzregate
profits are independent of F (the number of incumbents).
Thus, positive profits are, in this model, consistent with perfect competition, in that we have
assumed homogenous goods, free entry, constant returns to scale technology, and Bertrand
pricing.
For completeness, we will briefly treat the case of p < c. Suppose first thar4"(t) > 0
for all t < RH -s'(guaranteeing that this inequality is satisfied over this range requires
stronger assumptions than those made in the preceding sections). Assume provisionally that the
equilibrium satisfies .!>c. Then
XH
21>
Consequently,we can find some (x,,s) with s <sHsuch that2'
u(x,) + 4'(RH SH) + XRH > u(xH) + '"(RHSH) + XRH
u(x + ''(RL-s4) + < u(x1) + '(RL5H) + XR,
￿(R,,x,cx,) + XRL.
By the intuitive criterion, agents must infer H upon observing (x, s). But the choice (x, s)
is feasible (since agents can buy from several firms); consequently, type Hs would choose it.
Thus, one cannot have an equilibrium where any agent pays an effective (or average) price
greater than c. On the other hand, it can be shown that marginal cost pricing is an equilibrium
when p <c.
Now consider relaxing the assumption that '11(t) >0for all t <RH - s.Inthat case,
maximization of type H utility subject to non-imitation as well as S4IXff￿c may imply that
higher income households should pay a price strictly greater than c (even though the
unconstrained optimum entails an effective price, s/x, strictly less than c). It is therefore
possible that non-convexities could give rise to a price above marginal cost even when p <c.
2'Consider some x <XHwith XH- x< and s < s,, such that type Ls are indifferent
between (x,s) and (xH,s,). For small, type Hs strictly prefer (x,s) to (xH,s,l.).Choose(x,s,)
such that s =sand x, is slightly less than x. By construction, the Ls strictly prefer (xM,sH.)
to (x,s). As long as x -xis sufficiently small, the Hs strictly prefer (x,s) to (xM,s,J.
Thus, the first two inequalities are satisfied. The third inequality is simply an equilibrium
condition.
224. An Extension: Advertisin2
Whenever equilibria entail positive profits, it is natural to think that competitors might
dissipate these profits through other channels. There is, however, no reason to believe that
firms will dissipate the profits described in section 3.
To illustrate this point, consider a more elaborate model in which finns can advertise.
Technically, there are many ways to introduce advertising into the model. Our strategy is to
assume that X is an increasing function of advertising (marketing), M. This can be justified as
follows. Thus far, we have not modeled households whose observable characteristics rule Out
thepossibility that they are of type H. Although these households have no incentive to signal,
their opinions may affect the status achieved by other members of the community. The effect
of advertising is to increase the number of these people who know the price of a good, and
consequently what the good signifies about the consumer's income. That is, upon observing the
consumption of a conspicuous product, more people infer RH when the brand in question is more
heavily advertised.
All else equal, individuals will prefer to purchase the conspicuous good from the firm
that advertises more heavily. One might think that this would cause firms to dissipate profits--if
there were positive profits, another firm could set the same price and advertise slightly more to
attract customers. But this proves not to be the case, for the same reason that firms do not
dissipate profits by reducing price. Although increased advertising makes the product more
attractive, it has the same effect on both Hs and Ls. As a result, advertising makes imitation
by Ls more likely.
Formally, we illustrate this point as follows. For simplicity, we define the scale of
wealth so that RL =0.This is not simply a normalization. In the current context, it implies
Although we have assumed that esteem enters utility additively, this is not essential to the
results of this section. There are many alternative ways to model esteem under which the
analysis also goes through; we use the additive form to illustrate.
23that there is no gain to purchasing an advertised brand rather than an unadvertised brand as long
as one is perceived as type L.
If type H agents were free to choose x, s, and M, they would select values that solve the
following maximization problem:
max u(x)+ ''(RH-s) + X(M)RH
x,s,M
st. u(x) +4'(—s) + X(M)RK￿ u(x)+
Assumingthat the non-imitation constraint binds, this is equivalent to maximizing
[4'(RH—s) —'P(—s)]+E(O,x,cx).
Note that the objective function does not depend on x or M. The solution is s =s.Any values
of x and M satisfying
u(x) +X(M)RH=(O,x,cx)—'P(—s) G
are then equivalent from the point of view of type H agents. In other words, firms are free to
trade off x against M, but not in a way that affects total utility.
It is interesting that when firms advertise more, they sell less at a higher price. The
model therefore predicts that firms should continue to advertise even when advertising conveys
no information about product quality (for example, when products have well-established track
records).
Incumbents would like to choose the levels of x and M that maximize profits (subject,
of course, to the restriction that they provide consumers with an efficient vehicle for signaling).




Whether or not these choices necessarily prevail in equilibrium depends in part upon our
assumptions about the resolution of consumer indifference. It seems natural to assume that
incumbents can vary x and M without loosing customers as long as their customers do not
sacrifice utility. Under this assumption, the equilibrium values of x and MH solvethe




(here we have assumed that X"(M) < 0).
Thus, allowing X to depend on M does not result in dissipation of profits. Rather, it
simply creates a new dimension over which incumbents maximize joint profits.
5.Imilicationsfor Tax Policy
The implications of our analysis for antitrust and regulatory policy are straightforward:
one cannot infer either product market failure or market power simply from the existence of
positive profits in markets for conspicuous luxury goods. The implications for tax policy are
equally provocative.
Suppose that the government imposes a tax on the conspicuous good, and that the per-unit
levy is related to the sales price, according to the function r(,p).Withoutloss of generality,
assume that the producer pays the tax, so that p is the consumer's price, and p -r(p)is the
producer's price. For the moment, consider tax-price relationships of the form
25r(p) =max{0, t(p -k)},
wheretheparameterstandksatisfy0< t <1 and k￿c. Ifsuchataxscheduleis
imposed, then the arguments of section 3 require only minor modifications. Assuming that p
> c, equilibria have the following properties: PL =c,p =p,and XH= x'.Moreover, in the
case where k =c,aggregate profits (per capita) are equal to 7(s -cx)(1-t),and total
government revenue is G y(s -cxDt.More generally, for other values of k ￿ c, profits
and revenues are indeterminant within bounds (recall that consumers may expend s to buy x
units in a variety of different ways, such as paying p for each unit, or by paying more than p
for some units, and c for other units). However, as long as k <p,total revenues are
bounded below by y(s' -cx)tQ-k)/(p-c).nThe sum of revenues and profits must equal
-cxD.Thus, in the context of our model, an appropriately designed luxury tax amounts
to a non-distortionary tax on pure profits.
The intuition for this result is fairly simple. The price of luxury brands is determined
almost entirely by demand conditions. Assuming that p >c,cost only enters through the
incentive compatibility condition. It appears there only because it determines the price of the
budget brand. Thus, as long as the tax does not affect the equilibrium price of the budget brand
(which is the case as long as r(c) =0),and as long as tax-inclusive costs are less than p, a
change in the tax-inclusive cost of producing the luxury brand cannot affect behavior. Instead,
it simply redistributes pure rents from firms to the government.
It is worth emphasizing that traditional modes of analysis would produce highly
misleading conclusions within the current context. Suppose that the inconspicuous good, z, is
nAssuming that all units were actually purchased at p, aggregate production would be yx,
and government tax revenues would be yxt(p -k).It is easy to verify that any other
combination of prices and quantities that yield total quantity x' and total expenditure s' generates
at least as much tax revenue; therefore 7xt(p -k)is a lower bound. Since (s' -cx)I(p-c)
=f,we can rewrite this bound as y(s -cx')t(p-k)/(p'-c).This expression reveals that the
government ends up with at least the fraction t(p -k)I(p - c)of total surplus.
26non-taxable. Assuming that the objective is efficiency, rather than distribution, what tax rates
should be selected for the various brands of the conspicuous good? As long as revenue
requirements are not too high, the preceding analysis implies that only luxury brands should be
taxed. This conclusion follows from the fact that a tax on the luxury brands is equivalent to a
lump sum tax, while a tax on the budget brands is distortionary. In contrast, the traditional
approach suggests that the government should raise a significant fraction of its revenue by taxing
budget brands.
Since all goods in this model are produced in competitive industries with constant-returns-
to-scale, traditional reasoning suggests that Ramsey-style optimal tax formulas are applicable.
As an approximation, one might assume, counterfactually, that demand reflects separable, quasi-
linear preferences, in order to exploit the weLl known "inverse elasticity' rule (which states that
the desirability of taxing any given good depends inversely on the good's compensated price
elasticity of demand). From this starting point, the traditionalist would argue that it is optimal
to raise all revenue by taxing a single good only if the price elasticity for that good is zero. But
in our model, the demand for the luxury good is highly price elastic.
To see this, suppose that budget brands are sold at positive price p. <p,and that luxury
brands are sold at some other price p. ￿ p" (as indicated earlier, when p >cthese
conditions are satisfied in equilibrium). Let x denote the quantity of the luxury brand
purchased by a type H consumer. Since this consumer purchases x" units of the conspicuous
good for a total of s', it necessarily follows that
px + p.(x' -x)=px".
Rearranging this equation, one obtains
x =x'(p'-p)/(p-p).
Using this expression, one can easily verify that
27= p+/(p+-p.)>1,
where denotes the (negative of the) own price elasticity of demand for the luxury brand.
Note that this is both a compensated elasticity and an uncompensated elasticity, since a change
in quantity does not affect the utility of a type H consumer (in total, he spends the same amount
of money for the same quantity and quality, and conveys the same signal).
The magnitude of €.(definedsimilarly) depends upon the curvature of u() and v(). It
is possible to select functional forms so that this elasticity is small in comparison to .Thus,
the traditionalist could well reach the false conclusion that it is desirable to raise the bulk of
government revenue by taxing budget brands, rather than luxury brands.
A more sophisticated traditionalist might object that the demand system described in
preceding sections would exhibit substantial cross-price elasticities, thereby invalidating the
simple inverse elasticity rule. This observation suggests that the more general form of Ramsey's
optimal commodity tax formulas should be used. For the case at hand, these formulas can be
written as follows:
r+E÷+/p÷ + r.€ip.= C
r+/p÷ + r_/p. =C
where r. and r are per-unit taxes on the budget and luxury brands, respectively, ÷.isthe
compensated cross elasticity of demand for the luxury brands with respect to the price of budget
brands (similarly for &+),andC is some constant. Is it possible to have a solution to this
system for which r.0? Since the expressions on the left hand sides of these two equations
must be equal, r. =0implies that (r/p÷)(E -&+) = 0.Sinceand areof opposite
signs, it follows that r =0.Consequently, if one wishes to raise positive revenue, one cannot
possibly have a solution to the Ramsey equations with r. =0.Thus, even the sophisticated
traditionalist is led to an erroneous conclusion.
28There is, however, one sense in which one can partially reconcile traditional thinking on
optimal taxation with the analysis of this paper. Note that IQIal demand for flbrandsof the
conspicuous good (x) is completely inelastic with respect to the price of luxury brands, but
sensitive to the price of budget brands. Since these brands all provide the same intrinsic utility,
and since (with separation) esteem is invariant with respect to changes in prices, it makes sense
to tax the luxury brands.
A related point concerns the elasticity of government revenues with respect to the tax
rate, en,. When k =c,it is trivial to verify that €,= 1.This is the same formula that one
would obtain for the revenue elasticity of an ad valorem tax when the demand for the taxed good
is completely inelastic. Note also that revenues increase with the tax rate. This is particularly
interesting in light of the results of Bernheim [1991a], who used a related signaling model to
describe corporate dividend policy. In that model, government revenues were invariant with
respect to the dividend tax rate (as long as the rate was positive).
So far, we have confined our remarks to a very specific family of tax schedules. This
family is of particular interest, since it includes the federal luxury taxes created by the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. In particular, this Act imposed a 10% excise tax (I =0.1)
on the portion of the retail price of certain items that exceeds a product-specific threshold (k).
The thresholds are: $30,000 for automobiles, $100,000 for boats and yachts, $250,000 for
aircraft, and $10,000 for jewelry and furs.
It is nevertheless worth noting that the results of this section do not depend to any
significant extent on the particular form of the luxury tax assumed here. The analysis proceeds
similarly, and generates identical conclusions, as long as r(c) =0,p >c+ r(p) for p slightly
greater than c as well as for some p ￿ p, and r(q) ￿ 0 for all q.
The analysis has also presupposed that there is only one inconspicuous good, and one
conspicuous good (of which there are, of course, many brands). The extension to an arbitrary
number of inconspicuous goods is thvial. It is only slightly more difficult to introduce other
29conspicuous goods. The conclusions are essentially unchanged, except that the distribution of
profits across conspicuous good markets is indeterminant. This implies that the response to an
increase in the luxury tax rate on some specific conspicuous good is also indeterminant. It is
possible, for example, that prices could simply adjust so that profits shift to a more lightly taxed
industry (with sidepayments among firms, one might even expect this to occur). Thus, there
may be advantages to adopting a reasonably broad-based luxury tax, such as the one envisioned
in recent legislation.
In a related paper, Ng [1987] studied optimal taxation of a special class of commodities,
which he labelled "diamond goods". The distinguishing characteristic of a diamond good is that
consumers' preferences are defined over the amount of money spent to acquire it, rather than
over the amount consumed. A change in the price of a diamond good does not alter the utility
received by consumers —inresponse to a price change, consumers simply adjust purchases to
keep total expenditures fixed. Consequently, the optimal rate of taxation for a diamond good
is infinite. In contrast, our analysis is not predicated on the assumption that consumers enjoy
spending money. Consumers benefit from purchasing overpriced goods only because, in
equilibrium, conspicuous consumption serves as a signal of wealth, thereby enhancing status.
Our analysis also describes the nature of competition among producers of luxury goods, and
demonstrates that there is a maximum non-distortionary tax.
6. Discussion of Assumotions
Throughout this paper, we have maintained two important implicit assumptions. Our
objective in this section is to make these assumptions explicit, and to evaluate their validity.
The first assumption is that firms cannot make a secret price concession to any given
buyer. If secret concessions are possible, then the equilibrium described in section 3 will break
down: type H agents prefer to buy the conspicuous luxury good at a lower price, as long as they
30still get credit for purchasing it at the higher price?'
There is a solution to this problem. Each luxury brand producer clearly has an incentive
to commit himself to a policy of making no secret concessions. Indeed, the argument in the
preceding paragraph implies that the signaling value of conspicuous consumption is present only
if the producer has made a credible commitment of this sort. One approach is to rely on
intermediaries. By selling products to intermediaries (e.g. car dealerships) at publicly observable
prices that exceed marginal cost, the manufacturer places a lower bound on secret price
concessions (equilibrium prices cannot be less than "dealer invoice"). Another possibility is that
manufacturers will rely on reputations. Once a luxury brand acquires a reputation for being sold
at heavy discounts, the "snob value" associated with its purchase may be eroded.
A second implicit assumption concerns the resolution of indeterminacy (a point alluded
to at the end of the preceding section). It is well recognized (e.g. in the literature on signaling
in financial markets) that equilibria such as those considered in this paper are characterized by
"money burning." (By money burning, we mean an action that imposes the same cost on all
agents regardless of type). Agents must waste a certain amount of money to sustain the
equilibrium, but, as a formal matter, they are indifferent between overpaying for conspicuous
goods and other dissipative activities, such as literally burning money. We recognize that
individuals throw money away in a variety of forms --witness,for example, the phenomenon
of heavy tipping by "high rollers." Even so, we would argue that, in practice, most methods
of burning money are inferior to conspicuous consumption.
To effectively signal wealth, the act of burning money must be observed readily by large
numbers of people, even if these people make little or no attempt to observe it. Thus, burning
dollar bills on one's front lawn is an excellent way to destroy one's resources, but relatively few
people will observe the spectacle and make the desired inference. This is true for two reasons:
'This also motivates manufacturers to thwart the distribution of imitations of their products,
such as fake Rolex watches and Polo shirts.
31first, only immediate neighbors will have the opportunity to observe this activity during the
ordinary course of social activity, and second, the activity itself is rather brief, and therefore
provides a rather small window for observation. In contrast, one's automobile, jewelry, and
clothing are all observed regularly by numerous other individuals during the normal course of
social interaction. In addition, expensive durable goods provide durable emblems of resource
dissipation, thereby providing large windows for observation.
Consumers probably seek durable emblems of resource dissipation for another, separate
reason. It is possible to burn resources almost continually during the normal course of social
interaction, e.g. by tipping excessively at every opportunity. However, other individuals
observe this behavior only at isolated moments. For tipping to function as an effective signal,
others must believe that substantial resources are being consumed, which can only be the case
if current behavior is representative. If excessive tipping was interpreted as indicative of high
wealth, then individuals would have an incentive to falsely signal any time they were more than
usually anxious to impress their current company. We may therefore entertain serious doubts
about the wealth of an individual who is observed tipping heavily on any given evening. In
contrast, by purchasing an expensive car, one obtains a durable emblem of an activity that, in
one shot, has dissipated large amounts of resources. When others observe the car, they have
no reason to wonder whether it is representative of automobiles that the individual drives at other
points in time (this, of course, assumes that rental vehicles are readily identifiable).
On the basis of these arguments, it seems to us that the ideal candidates for resource
dissipation are durable goods that many others will readily observe during the normal course of
social interaction (i.e., that are conspicuous) and believe to be representative. Clearly, this does
not completely resolve the issue of indeterminacy, nor does it rule out all possible alternatives.
One might wonder, for example, why households do not simply publish tax returns or audited
asset statements.If one takes our theory literally, it is also difficult to understand why
consumers remove price tags from their conspicuous possessions. Obviously there are other
32important considerationsthatinfluencethechoice of a signal; completely transparent exhibitions
of wealth seem socially unacceptable.
Our theory does not explain why people should dissipate resources through the purchase
of expensive automobiles, rather than through jewelry, clothing, or yachts. Consequently, as
mentioned in the preceding section, the distribution of profits across conspicuous good industries
is indeterminant. Given the diversity of actual behavior, we regard the fact that the theory
allows for many methods of dissipation as a virtue, rather than a difficulty.
The observation that agents can burn money in a variety of different ways is much more
troublesome in other contexts than it is in the current paper. Consider for example the literature
on financial market signaling. Investors have strong incentives to learn all relevant information
about stocks. Consequently, the firm does not need to undertake dissipative activities that
investors will observe with little or no effort; rather, they can assume that investors will take
the trouble to observe the signal. Similarly, they need not seek durable emblems of dissipation,
since potential investors can always review financial records (an investor need not wonder
whether the current dividend is representative --hecan simply look it up). Thus, one can
entertain general doubts about models with money burning without being skeptical about the
specific model examined in this paper.
Our analysis is also based on some highly restrictive explicit assumptions, but most of
these are adopted only for the sake of analytic and expositional simplicity. We have already
mentioned that the extension to cases with many different types of conspicuous and
inconspicuous goods is relatively straightforward.It is somewhat more difficult to derive
equilibria for models in which there are more than two types of agents. However, it can be
shown that our results survive this modification. We refer the reader to Bernheim [1991a1 for
an analysis of a related model; the arguments here would be similar.
337. Conclusions
We have presented a formal model of conspicuous consumption, and have examined the
characteristics of equilibria when conspicuous goods are produced by a competitive industry.
We have found that these characteristics differ fundamentally from those obtained in more
standard models. Several characteristics have intriguing potential implications for public policy.
First, the existence of positive profits does not necessarily imply that competition is in any way
imperfect. Second, within the context of our model, a properly designed luxury tax amounts
to a tax on pure profits, and is therefore non-distortionary. Both conclusions contrast sharply
with traditional thinking based on more standard models.
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